Does the burden of proof change when it comes to "human affairs and human interaction"?

Third, defendants contend that the trial court's references to concepts like "human affairs and human interaction" and "how people interact and what people do in everyday life" lowered the burden of proof. Defendants are right to say that jurors should not be instructed to convict based on the level of certainty needed to make decisions "in the ordinary affairs of life." ( People v. Brannon (1873) 47 Cal. 96, 97.) But that is not what the trial court told the prospective jurors. It instead told them that "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not mean "beyond all possible or imaginary doubt," becausein "human affairs," "human interaction," and "everyday life"some doubt can always be conjured. In so advising the prospective jurors, the trial court essentially paraphrased CALJIC No. 2.90, which explains that a reasonable doubt "is not a mere possible doubt[,] because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt." (Accord, Pen. Code, 1096.) We discern no error in the statement. (See People v. Romero and Self , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 42 & fn. 15, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855, 354 P.3d 983.)