Does the BIA abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen a Fijian refugee's application because it was untimely?

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh's motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(2), and because Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The critical question is... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.").