Does the Attorney General have the authority to determine whether there was extrinsic fraud at the sentencing hearing of a defendant?

Several conclusions are obvious. The first is that a possible discrepancy between defendant's representation and reality was known to the deputy district attorney at the time of the hearing at which the initial sentence was pronounced. The second is that this discrepancy was raised by the deputy at that hearing. The third is that nothing done by defendant prevented the prosecution from learning of the true state of affairs. Finally, it is clear that the prosecution's knowledge was no greater when the trial court subsequently purported to resentence defendant. Thus, what occurred at the initial sentencing proceeding was intrinsic fraud that the prosecution could have guarded against at that time with the information it then possessed. (See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467 at pp. 472-473, 82 Cal.Rptr. 489, 462 P.2d 17; In re Marriage of Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 1051 at pp. 1068-1070, 202 Cal.Rptr. 116.) We are consequently precluded from agreeing with the Attorney General that extrinsic fraud occurred.