Does Section 667 of the Three Strikes Act bar the trial court from dismissing a prior strike allegation?

The People's position is that subdivision (f)(2) of section 667 operates to preclude the trial court from dismissing a prior strike allegation under the Three Strikes law except on motion of the prosecutor. The People rely on a maxim of statutory construction--expressio unius est exclusio alterius--which means a specific legislative grant of power implies that no other power passes. (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 196, 132 Cal.Rptr. 377, 553 P.2d 537.) In other words, the People contend that because subdivision (f)(2) authorizes the prosecutor to move to dismiss a prior strike allegation under section 1385 or because of insufficient evidence, but only authorizes the court to dismiss due to insufficient evidence, by implication the court is deprived of authority to dismiss a prior strike allegation under section 1385.

Casillas asserts two rejoinders: first, the Three Strikes law does not in fact abrogate existing trial court authority under section 1385 to dismiss a prior [49 Cal.App.4th 1841] strike allegation; second, any legislation which conditions such authority on prosecutorial approval violates the constitutional separation of powers. (See People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993.) We do not address the second point, because we are persuaded by the first.