Does Section 2J1.2(c)(1) of the Criminal Code require proof of obstruction of justice to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence?

We have not previously considered whether the underlying offense whose prosecution is obstructed must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence (or any other measure) before applying 2J1.2(c)(1). But we have recognized in the case of perjury, which is treated similarly to obstruction of justice,⁸ that the conduct "is itself more gravely wrongful if the proceeding in which it occurred had greater stakes. " United States v. Keys, 67 F.3d 801, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (Part D), vacated, but later reinstated in 153 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (reinstating Part D of 67 F.3d 801). From this it follows that proof of the underlying offense is not material, because the point of the cross reference is to punish more severely (and to provide a greater disincentive for) perjury in, and obstruction of, prosecutions with respect to more serious crimes.