Does section 1959(a) of the RICO Act require a defendant to commit a violent crime for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity?

Section 1959(a)'s phrase "for the purpose of . . . maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity" is to be interpreted in accordance with "its plain terms," giving those terms their "ordinary meaning," United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001). "Thus, on its face, section 1959 encompasses violent crimes intended to preserve the defendant's position in the enterprise or to enhance his reputation and wealth within that enterprise." Id. (emphases in original). Further, maintaining or increasing his position in the RICO enterprise need not have been the defendant's sole, or even his principal, motivation. Rather, "the motive requirement is satisfied if the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership." United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d at 295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted).