Does section 1170.18(c) of the California Penal Code have to be interpreted differently than the plain meaning of the statute?

The other presumption directs that in the absence of more reliable guidance, doubtful provisions of penal statutes are to be construed in favor of the defendant. (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1481, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 405["Where the statute is susceptible of two reasonable constructions, a defendant is ordinarily entitled to that construction most favorable to him."].) If this rule does not apply here, it is only because section 1170.18(c)contains no ambiguity that the presumption can operate to resolve. (See ibid .;

[200 Cal.Rptr.3d 452]

People v. Ramirez (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 260["The rule of lenity applies as a tie-breaking principle where ' " 'two reasonable interpretations of the statute

[245 Cal.App.4th 1218]

stand in relative equipoise.' " ' [Citation.] Where that situation exists, the court must 'prefer the interpretation that is more favorable to the defendant.' [Citation.]"].) Here there is just one literal meaning. But if the majority's reading of the statute did stand in "relative equipoise" with the plain meaning of the statute (People v. Ramirez, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 260), this presumption would militate in favor of the latter.