Does an RICO indictment that fails to allege that a forged document is a crime?

In assessing whether the indictment charges an offense under the statutory provision alleged, we note that "[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as 'those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.' " Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1881)). When, however, one element of the offense is implicit in the statute, rather than explicit, and the indictment tracks the language of the statute and fails to allege the implicit element explicitly, the indictment fails to allege an offense. See id. at 613 (indictment that failed to allege that the defendant knew an uttered document was forged failed to charge a crime although statute did not make the knowledge element explicit); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 58-59, 64-65 (where indictment tracked the language of RICO statute but did not allege economic motivation, which was an essential characteristic of the crime, the indictment failed to charge an offense).