Does a sentencing hearing that is conducted on remand after a partial reversal on appeal constitute in itself a "new trial"?

The specific question we must answer is whether a sentencing hearing that is conducted on remand after a partial reversal on appeal constitutes in itself a "new trial" within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (2). We undertake this task acknowledging that "[t]he fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420.) As with any question of statutory interpretation, the best indication of legislative intent

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appears in the language of the enactment. (See People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 386, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 603, 48 P.3d 1155.) Further, "we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute 'with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.'" (People v. Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 899, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420; see also People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27.)

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