Does a prosecutor's argument that it is "easy" to vote for the death penalty diminish the individual responsibility of the jury?

Defendant urges that the prosecutor's argument may have lessened the jurors' sense of responsibility to individually arrive at an appropriate penalty determination. (See, e.g., People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 255-256, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669.) Although such argument in isolation might raise a legitimate concern that the jury was being misled, it could not have had such a misleading effect here. Throughout his argument the prosecutor sought to impart to the jury the gravity of their task and sentencing responsibilities: "I think the toughest thing that you will ever do, if you vote for the death penalty in this case, is to follow that instruction and do what the instruction says to do. To say that it's easy to vote for that [the death [765 P.2d 96] penalty] is a joke. Although there's nothing funny about it, it's extremely difficult. And we talked about that a great deal as this case started, and I [47 Cal.3d 648] don't think there is a person up there who thinks it's something easy.... [p] No one on this jury answered the questions, led anyone to believe, counsel or myself, that you think it would be easy to vote for the death penalty. It is tough. It might be the toughest thing you ever do. But it's called for here. It's called for by the law." (Italics added.) ¹¹