Does a prior conviction for carrying a loaded firearm constitute moral turpitude?

Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in admitting the impeachment evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. More specifically, defendant contends the court failed to make any assessment of the least adjudicated elements of the offense of carrying a loaded firearm to determine whether it involves moral turpitude, and therefore failed to make the proper threshold inquiry as to relevance. (See People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 390 [whether a conviction for a given offense involves moral turpitude "is a question of law; its answer depends on the elements of each crime in the abstract, rather than the underlying facts of the earlier prosecutions"], and People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317 [a "prior conviction should only be admissible for impeachment if the least adjudicated elements of the conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude"].)