Does a jury's finding that a victim was killed in order to prevent him from testifying in a criminal proceeding require a reversal of his kidnapping and first degree murder conviction?

Notwithstanding such instructional error relating to the first special circumstance, defendant does not argue that such error requires reversal of his conviction of kidnaping and first degree murder. We agree that under the appropriate standard enunciated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, the trial court's error in instructing the jury on the first special circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to defendant's conviction of first degree murder. The jury's finding that the victim was killed in order to prevent his testimony in a criminal proceeding--i.e., the second special circumstance alleged--shows of necessity that the jury accepted the prosecution's argument that the evidence demonstrated the killing was premeditated and deliberate, a traditional first degree murder. Thus the prosecution sustained a higher burden in proving such premeditation and deliberation than would have been required to prove that the killing had occurred while defendant was committing a kidnaping. This is true without regard to the conclusion we later reach on the true nature of the proceeding in which the victim was expected to testify.