Does a jury have to assume that if it returns a death verdict, the sentence of life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out?

As we have explained in prior cases, because of the possibility of appellate reversal or gubernatorial commutation or pardon, it would be erroneous to instruct the jury that if it returns a death verdict, the sentence of death will inexorably be carried out. But the trial court may give such an instruction at the defendant's request. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 378-379, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169 [citing cases].) The trial court, therefore, did not err in instructing the jury, at defendant's request, to assume that a verdict of death would be carried out.

We have also rejected the argument that the trial court is required to instruct the jury to assume that a verdict of life without the possibility of parole really does mean life without the possibility of parole. As we stated in People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 562, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420: "`When a term is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request. [Citation.] In this case, the term "confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole" was used in the common and nontechnical sense that the plain meaning of the words

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convey. Accordingly, the court was not required to give an instruction as to its meaning sua sponte.' [Citation.]" In the present case, defendant did not request such an instruction, nor was the court required to give the same. This contention is without merit.

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