Does a jury have a duty to produce written findings of fact and conclusions of law in a death penalty case?

We rejected a similar contention in People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587. There, the defendant asserted that when a jury decides the penalty in a capital case, the jury is constitutionally obligated to prepare written findings explaining its decision to impose the death penalty. We disagreed, pointing out that "the trier of fact must make a special finding of the truth of each alleged special circumstance," and that at

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Defendant insists that his case is distinguishable from People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587, because here the penalty was determined by a judge, not a jury. He claims the difference is significant because on appellate [3 Cal.4th 572] review of a death sentence following a jury trial, the reviewing court will be able to examine the jury instructions, which may be helpful in ascertaining the jury's reasons for imposing the death sentence. But the availability of jury instructions was of no significance to our conclusion in Frierson that the jury was not obligated to make findings of fact. As with a jury, a judge sitting as the trier of fact must make a specific finding of the truth of each alleged special circumstance, and at the time of the automatic motion for modification, the court must state the reasons for its findings. ( 190.4, subd. (e).) These protections are sufficient to ensure adequate appellate review.

Defendant also contends that the trial court's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law at the guilt phase of the trial deprived him of his right under the federal Constitution to "guided discretion" in the application of the death penalty. (See Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 166, 188-189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2922, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859.) Defendant argues that such findings are necessary to ensure adequate appellate review both of the trial court's guilt determination and its choice of the death penalty instead of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. Noting that the prosecution's case-in-aggravation consisted almost entirely of the circumstances of the crimes as shown by the evidence presented at the guilt phase, defendant maintains that it is impossible to determine what exactly the trial court determined the circumstances of the crimes to be, and which aspects of the capital crimes the trial court thought to warrant the verdict of death.