Does a judge have a duty and duty to control the conduct of the trial?

A trial court has "both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the trial." (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.) In resolving whether a trial judge made improper comments, "'[o]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.'" (Ibid., quoting United States v. Pisani (2d Cir. 1985) 773 F.2d 397, 402.)

Here, appellant has not shown that the trial judge's comments denied him a fair trial. First, we presume that any jurors who heard the remarks followed the trial court's instructions, and ignored the comments of both appellant and the trial judge. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803 [presumption is that "'jurors understand and follow the court's instructions'"].) Second, with respect to jurors who heard both appellant's and the judge's comments, any resulting prejudice was due solely to appellant's own conduct. With respect to jurors who heard only the judge's comment, they would have understood that appellant had used disrespectful and inappropriate language, not threats. The judge stated: "If I hear that language from you again, if I hear a threat, you will not remain in the courtroom." He did not say that appellant had made threats. In short, appellant has not shown the judge's comment was prejudicial. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied appellant's mistrial motion and his motion for a new trial. (See

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