Does a disparity in sentencing between the most serious and most severe crimes violate a defendant's right to procedural due process?

Defendant also contends that the disparity in sentencing violates his right to procedural due process because it is predicated on the trial court's choice of crime to be used as the base term for sentencing, rather than on culpability. But so long as the statute is procedurally fair and is reasonably related to a proper legislative goal, there is no procedural due process violation. (People v. Flores, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 83, 223 Cal.Rptr. 465.) We can see no constitutional violation in a statutory scheme that permits (or even compels) a court to use the most serious crime according to punishment as [226 Cal.App.3d 1239] the base term in sentencing. This is a sentence choice properly given to the trial courts. (See People v. Barela (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 152, 156, 193 Cal.Rptr. 257.)