Does a defendant who has confessed to the commission of a crime have a constitutional right to object to the use of their confession?

A defendant who has confessed to the commission of a crime has a "constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession." (Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 376-377, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915-916.) Such a defendant "is entitled to a determination of the voluntariness of his confession in the state courts in accordance with valid state procedures...." (Id. at p. 393, 84 S.Ct. 1774.) Due process "requires `that a jury [not] hear

[79 Cal.App.4th 494]

a confession unless and until the trial judge [or some other independent decision maker] has determined that it was freely and voluntarily given.' [Citations.]" (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 687-688, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2144-2145, 90 L.Ed.2d 636, 643.)

California law is in accord: "The timely Miranda objection imposed on the trial court a procedural duty to determine the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary fact, i.e., appellant's waiver of his Miranda rights, out of the presence of the jury. (Evid.Code, 310, 402, 405; People v. Rowe (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, 99 Cal.Rptr. 816.) That a defendant is entitled to a voir dire hearing on the Miranda question before his extrajudicial statements are admitted into evidence is

[94 Cal.Rptr.2d 179]