Does a defendant have to plead no contest to a charge of possession of a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm?

Defendant maintains that given his explanation of why he had pleaded no contest, "the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, or confusing the issues, and of misleading the jury, and thus should have been disallowed under . . . [section] 352." But although evidence of an uncharged incident will often present the possibility that a jury might be inclined to view the evidence of defendant's prior involvement as evidence of his criminal propensities, "prejudice of this sort is inherent whenever other crimes evidence is admitted [citation], and the risk of such prejudice was not unusually grave here." (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 372.)

Under section 352, the trial court has the discretion to admit evidence that is relevant to prove a material fact as long as its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 856.) Although "[e]vidence of uncharged offenses `is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful analysis' [citations]" (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404), a trial court's decision to admit evidence under section 352 will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion (People v. Brown (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396).

Based on the record in this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting relevant evidence tending to prove a material fact. The fact the evidence regarding the 2005 incident was no more inflammatory than the testimony regarding the charged offense, the relative minimal nature of that evidence, and the temporal proximity of the two acts (less than two years between convictions) substantially reduced any prejudice to defendant. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) Additionally, any prejudice attributable to this evidence of prior misconduct is mitigated by the fact that the defendant was convicted of the uncharged robbery. Thus, the possibility that a jury might convict the defendant in order to punish him for the uncharged robbery is lessened by the fact that he had been punished for the prior offense. (People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427.)