Does a defendant have an absolute right to a continuance to facilitate choice of counsel?

A defendant does not have an absolute right to a continuance to facilitate choice of counsel. A continuance may be denied if the defendant had a prior opportunity to find and prepare counsel but was unjustifiably dilatory in doing so. (Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 590 [11 L.Ed.2d 921, 931] [denial of continuance for new lawyer to prepare did not violate due process where defendant had sufficient time to obtain counsel and did not request continuance until the day of trial]; Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791.) Although courts seek to accommodate substitution of counsel requests to the fullest extent consistent with effective judicial administration, a trial court retains discretion to deny requests made in an untimely manner that would result in an unreasonable delay in the processes of justice. (Courts, at pp. 790-791 [defendant was diligent in contacting attorney two months before trial and took reasonable and timely steps to obtain representation, and apprised court of efforts at earliest possible time]; Jeffers, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pp. 849-850.)