Does a defendant have a "vested right" to attend a parole review hearing?

Appellant seeks to distinguish respondent from defendants in the afore-cited cases on the ground that respondent has no "vested right to parole". However, the law need not impair a vested right to violate the ex post facto prohibition. (Weaver v. Graham, supra, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17.) "The presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant ... to the ex post facto prohibition ...." (Id., at p. 30, 101 S.Ct., at p. 965.) Furthermore, since section 3065 placed respondent in the same situation as if section 3041.5 were the law at the time he committed the offense (see In re Bray 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 517, 158 Cal.Rptr. 745), respondent had a "vested right" to annual review hearings. "Section 3041.5 defines the rights of prisoners and the duties of the board ...." (In re Fain (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 540, 546, 193 Cal.Rptr. 483, emphasis added.)