Does a defendant have a right to be present when he is sentenced?

A defendant has the "constitutional right to be present when he is sentenced." United States v. DeMartino, 112 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1997). Therefore, "where there is a direct conflict between an unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment and commitment[,] the oral pronouncement must control." United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks, alternations, and emphasis omitted). A district judge, however, is not required to pronounce standard conditions of supervised release orally at sentencing. Standard conditions are "basic administrative requirement[s] essential to the functioning of the supervised release system," id. at 63 (quoting United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d

Page 6

757, 764 (2d Cir. 1992)), and the district court does not deprive a defendant of his right to be present at sentencing by failing to reference explicitly "each and every standard condition of supervision," id. Conversely, a district court deprives a defendant of his right to be present at sentencing if the final judgment contains special conditions of supervised release that were not part of the court's oral pronouncement of his sentence. United States v. Handakas, 329 F.3d 115, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2003).