Does a crime of violence under Section 69(a)(2) of the Statutory 4B1.2(a) residual clause of the Criminal Code apply to a charge of recklessly striking another person?

4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause is remarkably similar; it defines a crime of violence as conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. See United States v. GomezLeon, 545 F.3d 777, 78889 (9th Cir.2008) (noting that the 4B1.2(a)(2) serious risk of injury test resembles the 16(b) substantial risk/use of force test, and that it is unclear whether there is any meaningful difference between the two risk-based approaches). Consistent with our reasoning in FloresLopez, we conclude that a conviction under the actually resisting prong of 69(a) does not constitute a crime of violence under the residual clause. We therefore need not consider whether a conviction under the attempting to deter prong involves a residual-clause crime of violence.