Does a chambers judge have an obligation to remit a case to the trial list just because there are conflicting affidavits?

Lastly, I do not agree, as suggested in Royal Bank v. Stonehocker, that a chambers judge is obliged to remit a case to the trial list just because there are conflicting affidavits. In this connection I prefer the view expressed by Taggart J.A. in Placer, quoted at p. 15 [pp. 212-13] of these reasons. Subject to what I am about to say, a judge should not decide an issue of fact or law solely on the basis of conflicting affidavits even if he prefers one version to the other. It may be, however, notwithstanding sworn affidavit evidence to the contrary, that other admissible evidence will make it possible to find the facts necessary for judgment to be given. For example, in an action on a cheque, the alleged maker might by affidavit deny his signature while other believable evidence may satisfy the court that he did indeed sign it. Again, the variety of different kinds of cases which will arise is unlimited. In such cases, absent other circumstances or defences, judgment should be given.