Counsel also refers to her statement at para. 37 of her reasons to the effect that, if past conduct per se gave rise to a Mareva injunction in every case of corporate fraud, then Mareva injunctions would issue as a matter of law in such cases and that “That is not the law in this province.” Counsel submits that these statements, in particular, indicate that Wedge J. viewed the first and second stages of the test as being in water-tight compartments, such that past conduct could never satisfy the second stage test for a Mareva injunction, but that “something more” would always be required. Counsel submits that this view is inconsistent with other cases in B.C. where courts have stated that a strong prima facie case of fraud can lead to an inference that there is a risk that assets may be removed from the jurisdiction. (See, for example, Netolitzky v. Barclay, 2002 BCSC 1307, 2002 BCSC 1098.)
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