The appellant also argues that the chamber judge erred in determining that C. was a child of the marriage, or, more specifically, that her trip to France was “other cause” within the meaning of The Divorce Act which would constitute her being a child of the marriage. The findings of fact made by the trial judge with respect to the nature of the educational program, the experience that C. had and the benefit that she received were all findings that he was entitled to make on the evidence before him. In our view, he carefully considered both the law and the factors which bear on a determination of whether a child remains a child of the marriage after age 18 and we can see no reason to disagree with his determination. The appellant relied on Ethier v. Skrudland, 2011 SKCA 17, [2011] 4 W.W.R. 608, for the proposition that trips like this to France were not educational undertakings and that children who make such trips are no longer children within the meaning of The Divorce Act. As explained in court, that case is not authority for that proposition.
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