Can the government charge a particular predicate crime but prove an uncharged predicate crime?

The Majority's reliance on United States v. Shill , 740 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 2014), is similarly unavailing. There, we considered only whether 2422(b) "should be construed narrowly to preclude prosecution where the predicate criminal offense is a misdemeanor under state law." Id. at 1349. We relied on 2422(b) s use of the term "any" in the clause "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense" to hold that there was no textual basis to "exclude misdemeanor conduct from the statute's ambit." Id. at 1354. We said nothing, for example, about whether having charged a particular predicate misdemeanor, the government could prove an entirely different predicate misdemeanor. And the Majority cites no case where any court has even addressed the question of whether the government can charge a particular predicate crime but prove an uncharged predicate crime (and I have found no such case). Instead, the Majority attempts to use inapposite cases to reach the conclusion that " Section 2422(b) does not require the Government to allege a specific predicate offense or to prove that the relevant court would have had jurisdiction over the defendant for the commission of such offense." Majority at 723.