Can an employer be held liable under a negligent hiring theory for an employee's molestation of a minor?

Similarly, in Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, a hairstyling school could not be found liable under a negligent hiring theory for an employee's molestation of a minor where there was nothing that would have indicated the employee posed a threat of harm to minors he might encounter in the course of the work he was hired to perform. Consequently, "as a matter of law, hiring [the employee] did not constitute a breach of defendant's limited duty to exercise reasonable care in his selection of employees." (Id. at p. 1213.) The appellate court also held the minor's cause of action based on negligent supervision should have been disposed of by summary judgment. While the record contained evidence of the employee's conduct at work which, in hindsight, could have been indicative of the employee's "deviant sexual proclivities," such conduct "did not result in any complaints to [the employer] by the children involved or their parents." (Id. at p. 1216.) Thus, they could not be used to impose liability for negligent supervision on the employer, who had no actual knowledge or reason to suspect these incidents had occurred. (Ibid.)⁷

In Chaney v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152, a family friend alleged she was repeatedly sexually abused as a minor when she was visiting in the alleged abuser's home. She sought to hold the wife of the alleged abuser liable under a theory of negligent supervision. The appellate court found the wife's demurrer should have been sustained because the facts alleged, standing alone, were insufficient to show that the wife had knowledge of her husband's deviant propensities such that it would cause her to take measures to prevent the alleged sexual abuse. The court held: "It is not enough to allege that the sexual misconduct was conceivable. [Citation.] The plaintiff must allege facts showing that it was foreseeable, i.e., facts from which it can be inferred that the wife must have known that her husband was engaging in, or wished to engage in, acts of sexual misconduct with a minor." (Id. at p. 158, original italics.)