California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999):
Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1187, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044, illustrates this principle. In that case, the plaintiff relied on the unfair competition law to pursue an action that the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), otherwise prohibited. We "rejected the claim that a plaintiff may, in effect, 'plead around' absolute barriers to relief by relabeling the nature of the action as one brought under the unfair competition statute." (Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1201, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044.) A bar against an action "may not be circumvented by recasting the action as one under Business and Professions Code section 17200." (Id. at p. 1202, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044.) We found "the conduct of defendants alleged in the complaint" came "within the scope of [Civil Code] section 47(b)," and thus was "absolutely immune from civil tort liability.... To permit the same ... acts to be the subject of an injunctive relief proceeding brought by this same plaintiff under the unfair competition statute undermines that immunity. If the policies underlying section 47(b) are sufficiently strong to support an absolute privilege, the resulting immunity should not evaporate merely because the plaintiff discovers a conveniently different label for pleading what is in substance an identical grievance arising from identical conduct as that protected by section 47(b)." (Id. at pp. 1202-1203, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044.)
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