Can a prosecutor improperly cross-examine a defendant's prior criminal convictions in a criminal case?

of misconduct are such as to contribute materially to the verdict . . . ' (People v. Lambert (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 905, 908.)." The cases stating this rule have long since been overruled on this point (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 28-34, overruled on other grounds as noted in People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1155, fn. 8), and the "close case" exception once used to avoid the forfeiture rule is no longer recognized (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 48).

Moreover, we do not agree the prosecutor violated the trial court ruling. The People sought to admit defendant's prior felony convictions to generally challenge her credibility. (Evid. Code, 788.) The trial court ruled that the prosecution could impeach defendant's credibility by indicating she had been convicted of three crimes of moral turpitude, without specifying the nature of the specific convictions. To the extent defendant complains that the prosecution improperly cross-examined her regarding the specific nature of the prior convictions, she is estopped from making this claim. Defense counsel identified the nature of the convictions on direct examination.² "Since defendant is responsible for the introduction of the evidence, [s]he cannot complain on appeal that its admission was error." (People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 762.)

As to the cross-examination on the facts underlying defendant's convictions, we do not agree this was included within the scope of the court's ruling. The in limine ruling pertained to a prior conviction being offered as a specific instance of conduct "tending to prove a trait of [defendant's] character," (Evid. Code, 787, 788) such as dishonesty. The questioning on the facts underlying defendant's convictions was not offered as evidence of a character trait to attack defendant's general credibility. Rather, it was offered as testimonial contradiction, to contradict and disprove defendant's specific testimony that she was nonviolent and passive. (Evid. Code, 780, subd. (i); People v.

Page 12