Can a property owner bring an inverse condemnation action against a public authority?

The court concluded by holding that the language of section 357, authorizing condemnation of lands, referred "not to an action by a landowner to recover compensation for a taking, but to a formal condemnation proceeding instituted by the condemning authority." (United States v. Clarke, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 258, 100 S.Ct. at 1131.)

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This case does suggest that an action in inverse condemnation against a public authority may be instituted only if the public authority was authorized to condemn the property or property interest in question in the first place through exercising the power of eminent domain. (See also, Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 258, fn. 2, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2140, fn. 2, 65 L.Ed.2d 106.)

In Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719, an inverse condemnation case, the court was called upon to determine "whether a property owner who loses the use of the next intersecting street which affords him access to the general system of public streets should be compensated." (At p. 661, 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719.) The court held that the property owner's complaint for inverse condemnation withstood general demurrers because it alleged, inter alia, that the closing of the street crossing in question substantially impaired the property owner's right of access to the street. One of the contentions raised by the railroad was that it was not a proper party defendant to the action. This contention was rejected by the court which wrote, "defendant railroad was an active joint participant in closing the crossing...." (At p. 662, 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719.) The court arrived at this conclusion after taking judicial notice that a public utilities commission decision authorized the City of Los Angeles to close the street crossing in issue. It is apparent that the city, in turn, authorized the defendant railroad to participate in closing the street crossing. Implicit in the court's determination that the railroad was a proper party defendant in the inverse condemnation action was that it was a proper party defendant only by virtue of the authorization for it to participate in closing the street crossing.