California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 197 Cal.Rptr. 145 (Cal. App. 1983):
In Grimes v. Carter (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 694, 50 Cal.Rptr. 808, the court was faced with the problem of whether the statutory requirement (since repealed) of posting a bond before bringing an action for defamation could be bypassed by a plaintiff who brings an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than defamation. The court, at page 702, 50 Cal.Rptr. 808, stated: "It is elementary that, although the gravamen of a defamation action is injury to reputation, libel or slander also visits upon a plaintiff humiliation, mortification and emotional distress. In circumstances where a plaintiff states a case of libel or slander, such personal distress is a matter which may be taken into account in determining the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled, but it does not give rise to an independent cause of action on the theory of a separate tort. To accede to the contentions of the plaintiff in this case would be, in the words of Prosser, a step toward 'swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation.' If plaintiff should prevail in her argument it is doubtful whether any litigant hereafter would file a slander or libel action, post an undertaking and prepare to meet substantial defenses, if she could, by simply[149 Cal.App.3d 682] contending that she was predicating her claim solely on emotional distress, avoid the filing of such bond and render unavailable such substantial defenses as, for example, justification by truth."
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.