Can a jury infer malice from the factual predicate underlying the determination of a lack of probable cause?

The Weaver court recognized this dilemma was created when it decided to permit the issue of probable cause to go to the jury. As a result, and in response to the defendant's petition for rehearing, the author of Weaver wrote a second opinion supplementing his first. In the latter, he stated that the jury, in deciding the question of malice, could infer malice "from the factual predicate underlying the determination of a lack of probable cause." (Weaver v. Superior Court, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at pp. 192-193, 156 Cal.Rptr. 745.) We read this to mean that the jury may rely upon the same facts to reach each conclusion but may not rely upon one conclusion (absence of probable cause) to reach the next (presence of malice).