Can a defendant waive the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

We think the issue presented here is too important to be decided on the basis of a concession by the government, especially without the benefit of the district judge's initial analysis and consideration of the specific questions presented. Not yet settled are the precise instances in which a sixth amendment right to counsel arises in addition to the right to counsel derived from the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The case law of this circuit recognizing the stricter standard for waiver under the sixth amendment was born in post-indictment and post-arraignment circumstances. See United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1146-48 (discussing cases). The initial appearance before a magistrate at issue here reflects an earlier stage of the proceedings against the accused and, therefore, may implicate different rights. In addition, it is not clear what "more" may be needed to satisfy the stricter standard of waiver in each of the various situations in which the sixth amendment right may enter the picture. In the absence of a clear determination below of whether the sixth amendment right applied, and if so whether its stricter standard was met, we hesitate to act because we are unable effectively to review the issue.