Can a defendant rely on his unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication as a defense to a charge of implied malice murder?

Second, even if defendant presented sufficient evidence of unconsciousness, we agree with the Attorney General's alternative claim that the 1995 amendments to section 22 preclude a defendant from relying on his or her unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication as a defense to a charge of implied malice murder. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, section 26, subdivision Four, which declares "[p]ersons who commit[] the act charged without being conscious thereof" are incapable of committing a crime, is not at issue here. "Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is . . . governed by section 22 . . . ." (People v. Walker (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1615, 1621, fn. omitted; People v. Chaffey (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 852, 855.)

The first sentence of section 22, subdivision (a) declares, "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that condition." Case law has recognized this statute "is part of California's history of limiting the exculpatory effect of voluntary intoxication" (People v. Timms (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1300), and the foregoing sentence

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