Can a defendant be found guilty of aiding and abetting possession rather than the possession itself?

6 We think it important to add that we would probably reach the same conclusion even if we were to assume arguendo, and contrary to what we believe to be clear governing standards, that the "crime charged" was really "aiding and abetting" possession rather than the possession itself. It seems clear to us that when an indictment charges aiding and abetting possession, that charge can be proven by showing that the alleged aider and abettor actually was in possession. This would appear to follow from United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969). The indictment there had relied upon another of the means, specified in 18 U.S.C. 2, by which a defendant can commit the substantive offense, that is, the defendant was charged with "causing" the interstate transportation of counterfeit securities. The proof, on the other hand, showed that the defendant himself had transported these securities. The defendant argued "that because the indictment charged only that he 'caused' the transportation he cannot be found guilty for having transported the bonds himself." Id. at 250 n.6. While expressing consternation over why the defendant "was not indicted for having himself transported these bonds in interstate commerce," id. at 248 n.5, we nonetheless regarded the defendant's theory as less than compelling, remarking pointedly that "(i)t seems specious to argue that one who brings about a result directly cannot fairly be said to have caused that result." Id. at 250 n.6. Similar reasoning applies in the case at bar where the indictment relied upon the "aid and abet" language of 18 U.S.C. 2. To paraphrase then Judge, now Chief Judge, Kaufman in Scandifia, it would seem specious to argue that one who brings about a result directly cannot be said to have aided and abetted that result, the result being, of course, the commission of the offense. Thus, when an indictment uses the "aid and abet" phraseology, a conviction on the underlying offense can be obtained by proof that the so-called aider and abettor actually committed the underlying offense himself. In other words, in such circumstances proof of the commission of the underlying offense is sufficient to prove the so-called aiding and abetting offense specified in the indictment. With respect to a charge of aiding and abetting a possession, proof of possession would therefore be a sufficient showing, although it would not be a necessary one.