What is the test for accepting as true the evidence of a witness who has not been cross-examined?

That rule is argued by the appellant here on two sides of the case. To begin with, the rule in Browne v. Dunn does not stand for the proposition that a trial judge must accept as true the evidence of a witness, merely because the witness was not cross-examined on a particular point. Where a witness’s statement is inconsistent with other evidence adduced at trial, the trial judge is free to accept the other evidence, and find that the witness giving the implausible evidence is not credible. A judge is also free to give less weight to implausible evidence. To require a judge to give implausible evidence the same weight given to plausible evidence proffered by credible witnesses, because a technical requirement for cross-examination had not been satisfied, would unjustifiably fetter the judge’s ability to weigh evidence.

In the second place, the trial judge mentioned the rule in Browne v. Dunn as against the defence in argument, but his reasons do not rely upon it, and give other reasons to reject the accused’s evidence.