In Maruna v. Lopatka, 2002 BCSC 1984, Brooke J. said at para. 13: In any consideration of the residuary discretion we must start from the fact that the parties before the court have decided by mutual agreement to resolve their dispute by arbitration. The have agreed for a reason. Probably that reason is that they want one or more of the advantages that I have mentioned. Free and ready access to the courts on every point of law on which the arbitrator makes a decision will certainly do away with speed, privacy, finality and the maintenance of amicable relations…but the advantages of arbitration are not to be bought at the expense of fairness in matters of procedure, or a properly considered determination on matters of substance…. I now turn to what I conceive to be the core issue: whether granting leave is an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. Arbitration is an alternative to litigation and it is intended to provide a speedy and final resolution of the issues. No appeal from an arbitrator’s decision is available as of right. An applicant for leave to appeal must show that there is more than an arguable point. Were leave to be readily granted, the important distinguishing principle of finality would be diluted. This arbitration was conducted in accordance with a statutory requirement rather than the agreement of the parties. That, however, seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. The statute reflects public policy which may be seen as embracing the principles of speed and finality.
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