76. As alluded to in her discussion on custody, L’Heureux Dubé found that the role of the access parent is limited in scope at (p. 57): In contrast to custody, there is little jurisprudence or doctrine on the nature of access rights, probably because access has never been understood to confer entitlements on the non-custodial parent other than those which are specified in court orders. The fundamental principle, however, that has always been recognized by courts is that the right to access is limited in scope and is conditioned and governed by the best interests of the child. Anson v. Anson, supra, at p. 368, in my view, properly circumscribes the right of access at this stage in time as follows: Access can thus be regarded as a form of temporary possession with the powers granted by an access order being limited to those necessary to ensure the wellbeing of the child during the visitation periods. Access confers no right in the parent to influence the upbringing of the child — that is for the parent with custody or guardianship. ... However, under the Divorce Act, 1985 s. 16(5), a parent granted access has a right to make inquiries and to be given information as to the health, education and welfare of the child, unless otherwise ordered by a court.
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